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COMMENT
Behind the Battle Lines: A Comparative
Analysis of the Necessity to Enact




As of late, one of the more fertile battlegrounds in American
law has been in the area of products liability. Presidential candi-
dates, Congressmen, commentators, legal scholars, lawyers, and
everyday citizens have been drawn to the battlefield in order
that each may choose a side and draw blood in this war of attri-
tion. Accordingly, the fight to federalize products liability law
has been a particularly passionate one, and each side continues
to struggle valiantly to obtain victory 'for the American people.'1
Both sides have gone to great lengths to show why their
side of the issue is pro-Main Street and why the oppositions
view is not. So pervasive is the issue of products liability reform
that President Clinton felt it necessary during the first Presi-
dential debate to explain his rationale for vetoing the legislation
that came across his desk in late 1996.2 Regardless of whether
t J.D. candidate, May 1997, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
1. Not surprisingly, each side in this debate-those who wish to federalize products
liability law (the reformers) and those who oppose it-claim that special interests domi-
nate the others' position, but not their own. For example, the reformers' camp contends
that the trial lawyers have poisoned the opponents' viewpoint, and the other side claims
that big business has swayed the reformers with their monetary clout.
2. In rebutting Senator Dole's contention that special interests played a significant
role in his veto of the bill, President Clinton offered the following explanation:
I.had a person in the Oval Office who lost a child in a school bus accident
where the drunk driver caused the accident directly, but there were problems
with the school bus. The drunk driver'had no money. Under this new bill, if I
had signed it, a person like that could never have had any recovery. I thought
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the proponents or opponents of reform have a hidden agenda
controlled by special interests, one fact remains perfectly clear-
above all else, this debate became, and has remained politically
driven.3
Of course, politicking and posturing are nothing new around
the halls of Capitol Hill, and tort reform legislation itself has
had an extensive history within Congress over the past fifteen
years.4 However, one fact does remain clear about this most re-
cent incarnation of reform: its genesis lies in the general dissat-
isfaction among the American public that pervaded the country
throughout the midterm election year of 1994.
Frustrated citizens all across the nation felt it necessary to
make a change, and the result was a watershed election in
which the Republican party gained control of both houses of
Congress for the first time since the early days of the New Deal.
Out of this election came the now (in)famous Contract with
America, complete with a promise to remedy the defects of the
products liability system. 5
that was wrong. So I gave four or five examples to the Congress and I said,
prove to me that these people could recover, but we're going to eliminate frivo-
lous lawsuits, I'll sign the bill.
First Presidential Debate (telecast on NBC, Oct. 7, 1996).
3. Carl Bogus, in an intriguing article entitled War on the Common Law: The Strug-
gle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1995), provides an interesting
insight into the reformers' message. He claims that referring to this endeavor as "re-
form" evokes a certain progressive connotation to this undertaking while the actual
goals of the reform measures are rather reactionary in ideological terms. Id. at 5 n.15.
This anachronism serves to point out how intensely political this debate has become in
recent years.
4. Legislative involvement on the issue of products liability reform has a long track
record that extends back to the 97th Congress. This proposal, and one almost identical
to it in the 98th Congress, passed in committee but were the subject of no further de-
bate before Congress adjourned. See S. REP. No. 69, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1995).
Subsequent attempts at tort reform were made, and in late 1985, the Senate consoli-
dated several proposals and hearings were held on this bill in early 1986. After an ex-
tensive period of bill markup in committee, the bill was introduced to the Senate, and
the Senate agreed to the motion to proceed. No further action on this bill was taken. Id
at 16.
Action on reform measures was also taken by the House of Representatives in the
100th Congress. Extensive committee work was done on the bill in 1987 but the House
adjourned before considering the bill on the House Floor. Id. Action was then taken by
the Senate in the 102d and 103d Congress, but motions to invoke cloture on the floor
during both sessions met with defeat. Id. at 17. See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & The-
odore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Le-
gal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990).
5. Tenet Nine of the Contract was initially much broader than the bill that was
eventually presented to the President, and included securities litigation reform and the
"Attorney Accountability Act." These other two pieces of legislation also passed through
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Regardless of the historical underpinnings of and the re-
newed interest in reform, many issues have been raised which
cut to the very core of the doctrine of products liability law. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon those in a position of power vis-a-vis
this debate to understand how products liability law as a whole
works within the American system before addressing the thresh-
old question of whether or not the system is in need of repair.
Operating from the assumption that the system is flawed in
some respect, we are next confronted with the equally basic
question of whether, despite its inherently flawed nature,6 we
are in a position to fix it by way of federal legislation. It is this
latter question that forms the basis of this Comment.
In Part I, the discussion centers upon the reformers' conten-
tion that there has been an explosion of litigation in the past
thirty years which justifies an intrusion into states' rights. Part
II focuses upon the issue of punitive damages and provides an
in-depth look at the opposing viewpoints, and each side's respec-
tive conclusions on the matter. Part III presents and disects the
charge that American companies are placed at a competitive dis-
advantage in the marketplace by the current system. It also of-
fers an alternative explanation of why competitiveness is even
an issue in the reform debate. 7 Part IV of the comment draws
some conclusions regarding the subject matter laid out in Parts
I-Ill.
Congress and the former was enacted into law during the 104th Congress.
6. Even those opposed to tort reform are forced to concede this point, however, they
do so grudgingly they do it. Consider the following quote offered by Larry Stewart, for-
mer president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America: "[Wiell, now it [the cur-
rent products liability system] is a human system, and it can always be made better." In-
terview of Larry Stewart & Representative Richard Goodlatte by Cal Thomas (Telecast
on CNBC, Mar. 8, 1995).
7. I have deliberately chosen to refrain from an in-depth discussion of the issue of
Federalism in this context for a number of reasons. First and foremost, discussions of
the application of the Tenth Amendment are perhaps more theoretical than factual, and
as such, any discussion of these issues would compromise the functional approach taken
by this comment. Second, the issue itself has generated an intense amount of debate for
which I am ill-prepared to comment. For a comprehensive overview of this issue, see
Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 AIz. L.
REv. 917 (1996); Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An
American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 227
(1996); Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolu-
tion?, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 429 (1996); and Stephen D. Sugerman, Should Congress En-
gage in Tort Reform?, 1 Mcm L. & POLy Rav. 121 (1996).
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I. WHAT CRISIS?
A. The Hard Facts Regarding the "Litigation Explosion"
The idea of a civil litigation explosion has gained wide-
spread public acceptance in recent years as big business, the
popular press, and many influential public figures (most nota-
bly, our elected officials) have teamed up to spread the message
that products liability reform is necessary. Not surprisingly, this
approach has produced in the populace a general feeling of ani-
mosity toward a civil justice system that few understand.8 In-
deed, these attitudes have become more entrenched in the 1990s
as the positive perception of lawyers has sunk to an all-time
low.9 Correctly interpreting public opinion, the proponents of re-
form successfully juxtaposed their message against this back-
8. An especially poignant observation that reflects this observation was offered by
the head of the National Labor Relations Board in a commencement address at The
Ohio State School of Law in 1995:
Only two years ago, a National Law Journal Poll showed that only five percent
of parents... wanted their children to be attorneys. Undoubtedly, this unpop-
ularity is what has fueled a number of the legal initiatives undertaken by the
Republican Congress to the effect, for instance, that the loser in litigation
should pay all costs, that caps be devised for punitive damages, etc. [sic] (em-
phasis added).
1995 WL 297824 *4 (N.L.R.B.).
While opponents on both sides of this issue could go around and around discussing
the exact cause-and-effect relationship implicated here, it is sufficient in this instance to
realize that a relationship between these factors can reasonably be said to exist. Other
critics have also picked up on the link established between public perception of lawyers
and reform initiatives--consider the following quote offered by Henderson and Eisen-
berg: '[Ihndustry leaders have characterized products liability lawyers and clients as a
'plague of locusts' who 'have brought a blood bath for US. businesses and are distorting
our traditional values." Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 481 (emphasis added).
The strategic usage of the italicized language forces the hand of the legislator in two
ways. First, it forces him/her to be responsive to the business interests located within
his/her district or state. Secondly, it demands that he/she "stand" for traditional values.
Through the successful (albeit strained) linkage of these two concepts, business leaders
have made the choice easy for the individual legislator. Since traditional values and sup-
port for the current products liability system (i.e. lawyers) are now seen as mutually ex-
clusive, the legislator's choice is really no choice at all. Unfortunately, the net result
could be the total upheaval of a system prompted by insufficient data and spurious
claims.
9. The 1993 National Law Journal Poll found that 60 percent of the survey partici-
pants had either a 'fair' or 'poor' overall impression of lawyers today. NA'L L.J., Aug. 9,
1993, at 1, 22. Additionally, "[a] 1993 ABA poll comparing public attitudes toward nine
professions ranked lawyers third from the bottom, ranking higher than only stockbro-
kers and politicians...." 1995 WL 297824 *5 (N.L.R.B.). '"The [percentage] of people who
said that lawyers are 'less honest' than most people nearly doubled from the 1986 [Na-
tional Law Journal] poll [31 percent, as opposed to 17 percent in the 1986 poll]." NAVL
L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1, 20.
WAGING WAR ON PRODUCT LIABILITY 245
drop of animosity, and have managed to direct the public's ire
toward product liability litigation. The messengers of reform
have realized that disenchantment with the civil justice system
has spread, 10 and there is ample opportunity to exploit those
feelings. Business leaders and other reformers seized upon this
readily identifiable and highly visible area of the law, and the
fuse was lit. The synergistic reaction it created has pushed Con-
gress to the brink of enacting sweeping legislation that will
overturn two hundred years of common law development. A con-
cise and telling exposition of the perception of this field of law is
offered by professors James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg
of Cornell Law School: "[t]he overall impression is one of an
area of judge-made law on the rise, threatening to engulf the le-
gal system, harming industry, and requiring legislative reaction.
."11
Contrary to this opinion, recent scholarship indicates that
the real problem with the tort recovery system in the products
liability context lies in direct contravention to the well estab-
lished heuristics that the general public has adopted en masse.Y
For example, in an article written by Richard Abel in 1987, the
author asserts that the real problem of the tort recovery system
lies in the fact that it "fails to compensate needy, deserving vic-
tims."1' Further, he states that this low level of accountability
has undermined one of the primary goals of the tort system. He
argues that because lawsuits are so rare when compared with
the amount of potential meritorious claims, the system fails to
10. This is not to suggest that there has been an attack across the entire spectrum
of civil litigation. In fact, the reformers' message has been carefully tailored to limit it-
self to the narrow berth of products liability litigation. See generally S. REP. No. 69, at
58 (1995) (dissent). As the most easily understandable and ascertainable component of
the civil justice system, it is within the grasp of reformers to manipulate available data
to sway public opinion. Considerable force is given to this argument when one considers
another archetype of commercial litigation that has yet to come under attack despite its
much broader yet well hidden ramifications on the American economy: "Contract cases.
. have increased by 232 percent over the period [between] 1960 [and] 1988... 7 HER.
REP. No. 64, at 38 (1995) (dissent) (emphasis added). Considering that contract filings
"[comprise] 18.4 percent of all civil filings," K.R REP. No. 64, pt. 1, at 38 (citing Marc
Galanter & Joel Rogers, A Transformation of American Business Disputing? Some Pre-
liminary Observations, Working Paper (University of Wisconsin Institute for Legal Stud-
ies, 1991)) it seems logical that some attention ought to be paid to this area of civil liti-
gation, rather than allocating too much time attempting to reinvent a products liability
system that, despite its flaws, remains essentially viable.
11. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 481.
12. See, eg., Richard J. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIo ST. L.
443 (1987). See also Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 480.
13. Abel, supra note 12, at 447.
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exert a proper deterrent effect upon the manufacturer. 14
The unfortunate results that stem from a tort system in
which underclaiming is a chronic problem is that there is simply
no economic advantage inherent in adopting safety features
which cost more than the benefits they produce. The economic
reality all manufacturers face is that they are forced to produce
a product as efficiently as possible or the market will force them
out.15 A manufacturer would "have to discount the threat of tort
liability by ninety-eight percent in deciding how much to spend
on safety."16 Abel is quick to point out that "[tlhis is not a matter
of individual choice"' 7 and that "[a]n entrepreneur who fails to
cut safety costs whenever the tort system allows such savings
will be put out of business by a competitor who does." 8
Abel's findings have been confirmed by the Rand Corpora-
tion in a 1991 report that stated that "only 10 percent of per-
sons that are injured by defective products seek some form of
compensation through the tort system," and a mere two percent
actually file a lawsuit.' 9 The report also states that merely
seven percent of the total amount of monetary compensation
paid out to injured victims "is paid through the tort system."20
Further, the National Center for State Courts, an organization
that tracks state court cases, in a study released in March 1994,
found that only four percent of all state court tort filings are
product liability cases.2' "Tort filings, in turn, are only 9 percent
of all civil filings, and civil filings are only 27 percent of all fll-
ings" 22 By simple computation, all products liability filings con-
stitute (.04) x (.09) or .36 percent of all civil filings in the state
14. Id. at 460. See also infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the rightful
role of punitive damages in this context).
15. See Abel, supra note 12, at 460.
16. Id. This figure is supported by data that indicates that less than 10 percent of




19. S. REP. No. 69, at 58 (1995) (dissent) (citing Deborah Hensler, RAND CORPORA-
TION, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE: COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED
STATES, at 18 (1991)).
20. S. REP. No. 69, at 58 (dissent). The remaining 93 percent is paid through settle-
ment negotiations and insurance carriers. Id.
21. Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, 1995: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials, 104th Cong. 29 (1995) (prepared
statement of Larry S. Stewart, President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America)
[hereinafter Stewart Statement].
22. Id. See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATIS-
TICS: 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1994).
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courts for 1992.23 Carrying this computation a step further, we
can multiply the percentage of civil findings in terms of all fil-
ings (27%) by the percentage of products liability filings (.36%)
to obtain the percentage of the products liability cases with re-
spect to the total number of cases filed in state courts. By so do-
ing, we find that products liability filings account for .097%
[(.27) x (.0036)] of the total filings in state courts in 1992. 24
The report also contained evidence that "[s]ince 1990, the
national total of state tort filings has decreased by 2 percent."25
Similarly, Professor Marc Galanter reported that "excluding the
unique case of asbestos, the number of product liability filings
in federal court declined 36 percent from 1985 to 1991. "26 This
hard data clearly undermines the anecdotal evidence that propo-
nents of reform have forwarded in support of their effort to
"reign in" the civil justice system.27
B. Trial Juries are not "Out-of-Control" and in Need of
Guidance from the Federal Government
Another plank of the reformer's platform has been to assert
that within the confines of the "explosion of litigation" there
have been several other disturbing trends that have exacerbated
the problem and heightened the need for reform. The propo-
nents of reform have contended that trial juries have run amok
in both the amount of pro-plaintiff verdicts reached and the
compensation awarded the successful plaintiff.28 They have gar-
nered support for their positions with stirring references to
highly publicized cases.2 9 However, a hard look at the data com-
23. Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 29.
24. Id.
25. HR REP. No. 64, at 38 (1995) (dissent).
26. Id. (citing Marc Galanter, Pick a Number, Any Number, LEGAL Tass, Feb. 17,
1992, at 26, 27).
27. RR REP. No. 64, at 37-40 (dissent).
28. This contention has also been forwarded by the reformers as a basis for capping
punitive damages. For a more detailed description of the central arguments for and
against placing arbitrary, caps on punitive damages awards, see infra Part II.
29. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S. Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994), is a favorite example offered by those who seek to re-
form the system by claiming that jury awards are excessive and ridiculous. For a
description of the facts influencing the trial jury's award of $160,000 in compensatory
damages and $2.7 million dollars in punitive damages, see infra note 59.
Other examples have been reported on by the media:
[During a] debate on legal reform, [former Attorney General Edwin Meese]
pointed to a case where a 'burglar' was allowed to sue a school district after
falling through a skylight. What Mr.Meese didn't say [was] that the 'burglar'
was a teenager who had climbed up to get a lightbulb from a rooftop lamp so
248 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
piled by corporations, scholars, and governmental agencies often
point to the exact opposite conclusion.
A recent article in the New York Times examined the cur-
rent trends in jury verdicts in the area of tort litigation as re-
ported by Jury Verdicts Research, Inc.30 The research firm found
that between the years of 1987 and 1992, the plaintiff's chance
of receiving a favorable verdict in a premises liability trial
dropped from 65% to 42%.31 The study also looked at products
liability cases and found that between 1989 and 1993, the per-
centage of plaintiff's verdicts fell from 59% to 41%.32
The second indictment leveled at juries in products liability
cases in recent years is that the compensation awarded the in-
jured party in successful cases has become increasingly exces-
sive and unpredictable. However, in a follow-up to their
landmark 1990 article on The Quiet Revolution in Products Lia-
bility,3 Professors Henderson and Eisenberg trace the pattern of
jury verdicts from the mid-1960s to the present day and reach a
conclusion contrary to these claims.34
he could play basketball, and that the teenager was left a quadriplegic.
Richard B. Schmitt, Truth Is First Casualty of Tort-Reform Debate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,
1995, at Bi.
Another spurious attack has claimed that the Girl Scouts of America are under at-
tack from "predatory lawyers" because of the current system. Id. "Some ads relate the
number of boxes of cookies the scouts must sell to pay their liability premiums. One...
group calls the proposed legislation 'the Girl Scout Bill.'" Id. However, the director of
communications for the organization claims that it "is absolutely not the case" that they
have been "barraged with frivolous lawsuits." Id.
In fact, these and other extraordinary cases are routinely paraded in front of the
public as representative of the current state of the system. Needless to say, appeals to
anecdotal evidence and the overbroad generalizations that are created by repeated refer-
ence to these 'facts' simply cannot be utilized as a statistically reliable basis for imple-
menting reform measures. Inadequate sample size, lack of randomness in selecting the
sample group, and the consequent spurious conclusions drawn from the collected data
are but a few of the myriad of technical problems with the reformers' research methods.
30. Richard Perez-Pena, US. Juries Grow Tougher on Those Seeking Damages, N.Y.
Tnems, June 17, 1994, at Al. As is noted in Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson,
Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 761 n.88
(1992), JVR compiles and analyzes jury verdicts in personal injury cases across the US.
and considers itself to be the "most commonly cited source of information on American
jury verdicts." Id.
31. Perez-Pena, supra note 30, at Al.
32. Id. Figures available from the General Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO] also
support this conclusion. See S. REP. No. 69, at 59 (1995). It deserves to be noted that the
overall percentage of cases that reach a verdict are nonetheless a small percentage of
the total number of cases filed. Some experts estimate the percentage to be between ten
and 15 percent of the total. See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 30, at 761-62.
33. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 479.
34. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 30, 770-72.
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Their findings suggest that the years between 1965 and
1979 were characterized by "near unrelenting" plaintiff success
both in number of successful verdicts and increasing mean dam-
age awards.3 5 From the period 1979 to 1985, the authors assert
that jury verdicts began to become more pro-defendant. 6 During
this same period, they also found that the "mean award level in
the bulk of cases, those resolved without trial, followed the ear-
lier decline in median awards and has remained in decline
"37
Thus, for this period, the strong pro-plaintiff bias that char-
acterized the early years of products liability litigation was be-ginning to soften. The marked decrease in settlement awards
supports the contention that the tide had turned. As the success
rate of plaintiffs decreased, it is feasible to assume that the
market forces began to exert their influence and resulted in a
noticeable shift favoring corporate defendants. This assumption
is borne out by the increase in the absolute numbers of settle-
ments and the concomitant drop in the mean award for which
the plaintiff was willing to settle.
The products liability landscape had seemingly become hos-
tile to plaintiffs in the mid 1980s, and, according to Eisenberg
and Henderson that trend has since solidified. 8 In characteriz-
ing the battle between injured plaintiff and business defendant
as a "slaughter," the authors point to the fact that almost all
major statistical categories relevant to the discussion have
-swayed heavily in the defendant's favor.3 9 "Filings began to
plummet; success rates continued to fall ... [and m]ost mea-
sures of awards-means, expected returns, and sums-are
down."4"
Again, data collected and analyzed has undermined the con-
ventional belief that American businesses and consequently,
American consumers are being subjected to increased prices and
a lower standard of living due to the onslaught of products liti-
35. I& at 770. One possible reason for the increased rates of plaintiff success during
this period may be attributable to the effect that Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF ToRT (1965) had upon the common law landscape during this time. As judge-
made law continued to expand and flourish, so did the plaintiff's chances of being com-
pensated in a products liability case. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see
Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 479.
36. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 30, at 770.
37. Id.
38. Id. "From 1985 to the time of the most recently available data, the products bat-
tle has been a slaughter." I& at 770.
39. Id. at 770-72.
40. Id at 770.
249
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gation. As Eisenberg and Henderson point out, however, al-
though today's plaintiff is worse off than a plaintiff from 1985,
he is still better off than the plaintiff of the mid 1960s. 41 They
conclude their article by asserting that the trends that they ob-
served in their 1990 article4 have "deepened and strengthened"
and that whether or not their analyses are accepted, clearly
something changed in the 1980s. 3
Professors Henderson and Eisenberg's data does not stand
alone. Both the General Accounting Office [hereinafter "GAO"]
and Professor Marc Galanter have found similar results.' More
interestingly, the GAO found, also in direct contradiction to con-
ventional wisdom, that the awards that juries in five jurisdic-
tions across the nation were handing out were neither excessive
nor unpredictable.4 Specifically, the study revealed that "the
size of compensatory awards varied by type and severity of in-
jury in a manner consistent with underlying economic loss."4
This demonstrates that at least for those jurisdictions stud-
ied, juries approach the prospect of assessing and awarding com-
pensatory damages in a manner that is fundamentally fair and
inherently rational.47 Professor Lawrence Mann of Wayne State
University echoes this statement in a report written in 1989.
"Verdicts and settlements in products liability cases are not er-
ratic and appear reasonably related to the economic losses sus-
tained and [the severity of the] injury."
II. THE ROLE OF PuNiTE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIBirrY
CASES
A. The Rationale Behind Punitive Damages
Beyond any doubt, punitive damages 49 awards have pro-
vided the most fertile ground for attack by proponents of tort re-
41. Id.
42. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 4.
43. Id.
44. S. REP. No. 69, at 59 (1995).
45. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Product Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolution
in Five States" GAO/HRD 89-99 (1989).
46. S. REP. No. 69, at 60.
47. See HR REP. No. 64, at 39 (1995) (dissent).
48. S. REp. No. 69, at 60. In reaching this conclusion, Professor Mann "surveyed
over 2,000 businesses as well as attorneys of record in closed cases for the year 1987" at
the request of the Governor of the state of Michigan. Id.
49. Punitive damages have been efficiently described as "money damages awarded
to a plaintiff in a private civil action, in addition to and apart from compensatory dam-
ages, assessed against a defendant guilty of flagrantly violating the plaintiff's rights."
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form. Punitive damages have always been closely tied to the
contention that trial juries have routinely awarded excessive
compensation to plaintiffs in products cases. As such, these 'non-
compensatory damages' have become the most obvious target of
tort reform legislation.50 As the debate around tort reform has
become increasingly politicized, the facts and figures used by
proponents have seemingly become less and less accurate.5 '
Much of the debate has centered upon reformers believing
that excessive damage awards (created in large part by awards
of punitive damages) have sounded the death knell for the com-
petitiveness and innovation that has been the touchstone of
American business for two centuries. 52 An illustrative example
of the tendency of reformers to use hyperbole to lend credence to
their argument is demonstrated by the following all-too-common
statement: proponents of reform have put the "annual cost of
the tort system at $300 billion."53 Despite the fact that there is
simply no data to back up this claim, the point is nonetheless
made. The emotive impact of these statements provide an inval-
uable service to the reformers-it makes the need for tort re-
form seem imperative to the public. When combined with the
publicity generated by recent infamous cases,54 public sentiment
David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems, and Reform, 39
VILL. L REV. 363, 364 (1994).
50. Many states have enacted tort reform legislation that has placed a cap on the
total amount of punitive damages that can be awarded a plaintiff In most of the states
that have passed such legislation, the cap on punitive damages is set in one of two ways.
Either an arbitrary cap is set (somewhere between $250,000 on the low end (California)
and $1,000,000 on the high end (Wisconsin, West Virginia) or, alternatively, the amount
of punitive damages awarded is limited to double the amount of compensatory (eco-
nomic) damages awarded, whichever is greater.
51. Professor George Shepard of Emory University law school offers an example:
'When you look at the tort-reform debate and the evidence that people are using, it is
just appalling... [tihe numbers are sort of fetched out of thin air." Richard B. Schmitt,
Study of States Finds 7brt Reform Sparked Economic Growth, Jobs, WALL ST. J., Sept:
18, 1995, at B8.
52. 'For years, business groups have blamed the legal system for a variety of their
economic ills, saying that lawsuits have inhibited product development and hurt the
ability of U.S. business to meet foreign competition" Id.
53. Id. The 1996 Republican presidential candidate, Bob Dole, has interjected him-
self into this debate, claiming that, in essence, the $300 billion per year cost of the prod-
ucts liability system is devastating. Id. Others have placed the cost of products liability
litigation at anywhere between 132 and 150 billion dollars. 142 CoNG. Rc. H5746-04.
'[A]s a matter of fact, Paul Rubin at Emory University says that $82 billion of the $132
billion spent on tort liability has been pure waste and that was just for... 1990." Id. at
H4760. This representative did not try to define what constituted 'pure waste
54. See infra note 57. Much more anecdotal evidence is available in places like the
USA Today. Consider the following cases cited in an editorial in that paper on March 6,
1995:
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is transformed and the reformers' message is furthered.
This appeal to emotion is not lost on opponents of reform
and they have sought to squelch the rising tide of support for
reform. They have fired back with claims that the threat of pu-
nitive damages has encouraged product safety because it acts as
an effective deterrent to actors in a free market.55 As former
president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA)
Larry Stewart has said--"If you put a cap on punitive damages,
many defendants will be able to laugh at the threat of punitive
damages. It just won't register on their financial radar screen."5
While there may indeed be some evidence that leads to that con-
clusion, the opponents of tort reform would do well to concen-
trate upon the truth underlying the popular myths that are so
abundant as the debate over tort reform escalates. 57
Notwithstanding the effect that anecdotal evidence has had
upon the heart strings of legislators and the public in general,
The Alabama woman awarded $250,000 in punitive damages even though
she wasn't injured and wasn't even present when a gas water heater malfunc-
tioned...
The Miami woman awarded $250,000 after she, having used cocaine and
alcohol and splashed herself with gasoline, was severely burned trying to light
a barbeque...
The Florida theme park ordered to pay 86 percent of a woman's award for
injuries received on its "Grand Prix" ride, even though the jury found the park
only 1 percent at fault...
The tricycle manufacturer who settled out of court for $7.5 million rather
than risk an even more generous jury award over the color of its trikes.
Step Right Up, Place Your Bets Casino Style, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 1995, at 10A.
55. Tort Reform: Is a White House Veto Waiting in the Wings? THE HommE (Am.
Pol. Network), Mar. 7, 1995.
56. Id. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1269, 1277 (1994),
explaining that:
The doctrine of punitive damages is one of the few remedies that can constrain
a giant corporation that is willing and able to take advantage of its less power-
ful "adversaries" ... The remedy's effectiveness in [deterring malicious behav-
ior] stems from its unpredictability. Capping punitive damages would under-
mine the deterrent effect of the remedy by making it possible for corporations
to calculate their maximum exposure and therefore make a profit-based deter-
mination as to whether 'really mean behavior' is good business practice.
57. For example, advertisements that were run by reformers in support of their
cause cited the Liebeck case as a typical example of jury excess. See supra note 29. What
the advertisement failed to mention-and what the opponents of reform should attack-
is that McDonald's served coffee hotter than other eating establishments and that "the
company had received over 700 complaints of burns by customers and settled claims for
more than $500,000," yet the company took no action to avoid any further incidents. 7brt
Reform, supra note 55. Also not mentioned was the fact that a judge reduced the plain-
tiffs punitive damage compensation from nearly $2.9 million to $480,000 and the fact
that the case subsequently settled for an undisclosed amount. Id.
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the fact remains that caps on punitive damages have received
much attention not only at the federal level, but at the state
* level as well.58 As of March 1995, 14 states have placed limits
on non-economic (punitive) damages. 59 Since that time, various
other states throughout the country have enacted laws that
place upper limits on punitive damage awards. Among these are
IllinoiS, 60 New Jersey,61 North Carolina,62 Oregon, 63 and Texas.6
That the individual state legislatures feel the need to enact this
legislation is significant, but other serious issues are implicated
when federal legislation is proposed in this area. Legislation
that contemplates wholesale changes to a system that has been
in place for over 200 years demands a critical analysis of the
available data. Beyond this analysis, these changes also require
a careful balancing to determine whether the goals of the legis-
lation comport with the available data. Without truthfulness in
this endeavor, it becomes a very real possibility that the reforms
enacted will not meet the goals they are intended to achieve.
B. The Opposition's Argument in Favor of Punitive Damages
As alluded to above, the debate for reform has become
highly politicized and increasingly emotional. There are a num-
ber of presumptions underlying the reformer's calls for a re-
tooling of the non-economic compensation awarded successful
plaintiffs. Chief among these are the claims that "punitive dam-
ages are routinely awarded; they are awarded in large amounts;
the frequency and size of those awards has been rapidly increas-
58. It should be noted that those who oppose federal tort reform legislation also op-
pose state tort reform legislation. However, the problem faced by broad sweeping federal
action as opposed to state action promotes different concerns.
59. H.R. REP. No. 276 (1995).
60. ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 735/5.2-1115.05 (West 1995) (capping punitive damages at
three times the amount awarded for economic damages). Recently, an Illinois state ap-
pellate judge declared this statute unconstitutional on the basis that the states' attempt
to cap all forms of recovery violated the Due Process Clause of the XIV Amendment.
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-15:5.13 and 5.14 (West 1995) (§ 5.13 reconfigures the per-
centages of joint and several liability of manufacturers and § 5.14 sets a cap on punitive
damages equivalent to $350,000 or 5 times compensatory damages, whichever is
greater).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-25 (1996) (limits punitive damages to $250,000 or three
times compensatory damages, whichever is greater).
63. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 18.537 and 18.540 (1995) (caps attorneys fees at 20 percent of
punitive damage awards and requires a plaintiff to prove "malice" and "conscious indif-
ference to the... welfare of others").
64. TEx Civ. PRAc. & REn § 41.008 (West 1995) (punitive damages capped at two
times economic damages plus noneconomic damages up to $750,000 or $200,000-which-
ever is greater).
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ing; and these phenomena are national in scope."65 All of these
factors tend to point to a justice system in crisis-and in desper-
ate need of immediate reform. Such claims have even been bol-
stered by attempts to manipulate data in an effort to gain sup-
port for the reform movement.66 These characterizations have
led to the current limitations that may be placed on punitive
damages by section 108 of H.R. 956.67
65. Product Liability Fairness Act, 1995: Hearings on S. 565 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism, 104th Cong. 505 (1995) (testi-
mony of Dr. Stephen Daniels, Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation) [here-
inafter Daniels Statement].
66. In particular, Dr. Daniels points to the efforts of some reformers to characterize
their findings in a certain light. More specifically, he draws into question two articles
written by Richard J. Mahoney, the chairman and CEO of Monsanto, Inc. and another
article coauthored by Mahoney and Stephen E. Littlejohn. Littlejohn is the Public Af-
fairs Director for Monsanto. Id.
67. Section 108, in pertinent part, states:
(A) General Rule-Punitive damages may, to the extent permitted by applica-
ble state law, be awarded against a defendant [in a product liability action that
is subject to this Title] if the claimant establishes by clear and convincing evi-
dence that conduct carried out by the defendant with a conscious, flagrant in-
difference to the rights or safety of others was the proximate cause of the harm
that is the subject of the action in any product liability action.
(B) Limitaton of Amount-
(1) In general-The amount of punitive damages that may be awarded in
an action described in subsection (A) may not exceed the greater of-
(A) 2 times the sum of the amount awarded to the claimant for economic
loss and noneconomic loss; or
(B) $250,000.
(3) Exception for insufficient award in cases of egregious conduct.-
(A) Determination by court.-If the Court makes a determination, after
considering each of the factors in subparagraph (B), that the application of par-
agraph (1) would result in an award of punitive damages that is insufficient to
punish the egregious conduct of the defendant against whom the punitive dam-
ages are to be awarded or to deter such conduct in the future, the court shall
determine the additional amount of punitive damages . . . in excess of the
amount determined in accordance with paragraph (1) to be awarded against
the defendant in a separate proceeding in accordance with this paragraph.
(B) Factors for consideration.-In any proceeding under paragraph (A), the
court shall consider-
(I) The extent to which the defendant acted with actual malice;
(II) The likelihood that serious harm would arise from the conduct of the
defendant;
(Ifl) The degree of awareness of the defendant of that likelihood;
(IV) The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant;
(V) The duration of the misconduct and any concurrent or subsequent con-
cealment of the conduct by the defendant;
(VI) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon the discovery of the
misconduct and whether the misconduct has terminated;
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However, before the veracity of these four claims is dis-
cussed, it is important to understand the rationale behind puni-
tive damages. "Today, an award of punitive damages is predi-
cated upon behavior by the defendant that can be characterized
as malicious, wanton, willful, oppressive, or outrageous."68 There
is generally little debate on this issue, and despite almost uni-
versal agreement on the purposes of punitive damages, a philo-
sophical debate continues to be waged about the appropriateness
of the purposes of punitive damages. 69
(VII) The financial condition of the defendant; and
(VII) The cumulative deterrent effect of other losses, damages, and punish-
ment suffered by the defendant as a result of the misconduct, reducing the
amount of punitive damages on the basis of the economic impact and severity
of all measures to which the defendant has been or may be subjected, includ-
ing-
(i) Compensatory and punitive damage awards to similarly situated
claimants;
(ii) The adverse economic effect of stigma or loss of reputation;
(iii) Civil fines and criminal and administrative penalties; and
(iv) Stop sale, cease and desist, and other remedial or enforcement orders.
(C) Requirements For Awarding Additional Amount.-If the Court awards
an additional amount pursuant to this subsection, the court shall state its rea-
sons for setting the amount of the additional amount in findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
HR REP. No. 956 (1995). A bill identical to the one passed by both Houses of Congress
was introduced in the Senate earlier this year and is entitled "The Product Liability Re-
form Act of 1997. 143 CONG. REc. § 163-02, § 226. Section 108 of the bill remains un-
changed. Id. at § 228-229.
68. Daniels Statement, supra note 65, at 509. The concept of punitive damages has
been firmly entrenched as a manner of compensating victims for the intentional wrong-
ful acts of others throughout the history of jurisprudence. See generally Michael Rustad
& Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming
the Tort Reformers, 42 AK U. L. REV. 1269 (1993) (tracing origins of punitive damages).
In American jurisprudence, the concept of punitive damages as it is commonly referred
to today was elucidated by the Supreme Court as early as 1851. Day v. Woodworth, 54
US. 363, 371-72 (1851). "In actions... where the injury has been wanton and malicious,
or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to add to the measured compensation of
the plaintiff which he would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted
without design or intention, something farther by way of punishment or example....
Id. at 371. Several times over the past five years the Supreme Court has had occasion to
review the issue on punitive damages. Twice they have visited cases which emanated
out of the Alabama courts. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991),
and Gore v. BMW of North America, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
69. The debate over the usage of "punishment" and "deterrence" principles in a sys-
tem which does not provide the same safeguards as the criminal system poses some in-
teresting questions at the core of this debate. It deserves to be stated that some state
statutes that place a cap upon punitive damages also require a finding of a higher stan-
dard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence. See supra notes 63-67. These ques-
tions go beyond the purview of this Comment and will not be discussed in detail. For an
excellent summary of the arguments on both sides of this issue, see Product Liability
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Whether or not one agrees with the imposition of punitive
damages in products liability cases, there is strong evidence
that they serve an important purpose in the policing of manu-
facturers. Despite the infrequency of the use of punitive damage
awards in the products liability arena,70 an argument can be for-
warded that the threat of such damages being awarded deters
profit maximizing actors from producing unreasonably danger-
ous products. 71 A corollary to this argument states that as the
risk of financial censure decreases, the rational producer will be
willing to take on the risk72 and increasingly produce unsafe
products. 73 "[Clapping punitive damages completely undercuts
the valuable market incentive which punitive damages provide.
It is only the indeterminable nature of punitive damages which
[keeps] a cynical actor from making calculations weighing safety
against the cost of compensating injuries."7 4
Fairness Act, 1995: Hearings on S. 565 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, For-
eign Commerce, and 7burism, 104th Cong. 508-55 (1995) (prepared statement of Dr. Ste-
phen Daniels, Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation) [hereinafter Daniels
Prepared Statement]. For a more intricate treatment of these issues, see generally STE-
PHEN DANIELs & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLiTICS OF REFORM 199-238
(1995); and Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality of Punitive Damages,
75 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1990).
70. Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 29.
71. This is not to suggest that all manufacturers are bad actors with no social con-
science. It is merely assumed that a reasonable actor in a competitive market will al-
ways seek to maximize profit whenever possible. If there is no economic advantage in-
herent in expending more capital for the sake of producing a safer product in the short
run (i.e., avoidance of punitive damages), the reasonable actor will seek to lower costs to
the bare minimum. The manufacturer who does not produce a widget at the lowest pos-
sible (acceptable) cost will be forced from the market by others who produce lower priced
widgets because they are willing to forego the added costs of producing a safer product.
72. If one accepts this notion, then it can be assumed that if the financial risk im-
posed by punitive damages is discounted far enough, it will cease to be an effective de-
terrent and will be ignored by the manufacturer.
73. This theory supports the notion that manufacturers are willing to modify their
corporate behavior' in response to an adverse threat. "H.R. [10], by limiting punitive
damages to an arbitrary level, would undercut the important behavior modifying effect
of punitive damages." Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 30.
74. Id. at 33. Mr. Stewart argues that not only does the risk of punitive damages
act as a deterrent before the harm, but has also led to changed 'behavior' in the wake of
a judgment. "For instance, more than 75 percent of the non-asbestos defendants subject
to punitive damage awards between 1965 and 1990 took some sort of post-litigation step
toward making their products safe, usually in the form of fortified warnings, product
withdrawals, or added safety features Id. at 29. It should be noted, however, that Mr.
Stewart offered no authority for this point, and may be guilty of the "Pick a number, any
number" phenomenon that has enveloped this debate on both sides of the fence to a cer-
tain extent. See generally Galanter, supra note 26.
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Many proponents of reform contend that § 108 of H.R. 956
does not put an absolute cap upon the punitive damages that
can be awarded to a successful plaintiff. They point to the lan-
guage of the section that provides for a ratio rule which should
provide for adequate deterrence. Just how that nexus is reached
is somewhat confounding. The reformers seem to contend that
merely because a 'defective' product may cause an injury to a
high-paid executive or may cause an injury that requires an in-
ordinate amount of compensatory damages, 75 the manufacturer
will be sufficiently deterred. This logic simply does not with-
stand reasoned analysis. "The damage which the defendant ac-
tually does may have little or no relation to the size of the
money judgment which would be the most effective admonition
for the particular case."76 It is precisely this economic size of the
damage done that motivates businesses to develop safer prod-
ucts. By making it easier for companies to avoid meaningful fi-
nancial censure, the link between deterrence and punitive dam-
ages is broken.77
Notwithstanding the economic rationalizations that may
fairly be said to explain the behavior of corporate America with
respect to punitive damages, the proposed federal legislation
also offers another obstacle to the unwary plaintiff. The exact
language of H.R. 956 would require the plaintiff seeking puni-
tive damages to establish "by clear and convincing evidence that
the harm that is the subject of the action was the result of con-
duct that was carried out by the defendant with a conscious, fla-
grant indifference to the safety of others."78 Such a standard is a
far cry from the "gross and outrageous" conduct contemplated by
75. Section 108 provides for punitive damages equal to: (A) 2 times the sum of (I)
the amount awarded to the claimant for economic loss; and (H) the amount awarded to
the claimant for non-economic loss; or (B) $250,000. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108 (1995).
76. Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1181
(1931).
77. According to Morris:
When an act with a vicious tendency happens to result in a small injury the
"compensatory" damages are necessarily small. If it must follow that the puni-
tive damages must also be small, the total verdict might be lenient where se-
verity is desirable ... So the ratio test seems to be an impediment in many
cases, rather than a good legal tool. If it has any effect at all, it may limit pu-
nitive damage awards when they should be severe, and result in heavy puni-
tive damages when they should be lenient.
Id. at 1182. Of course, it is also necessary to follow the doctrine laid down by the Su-
preme Court most recently in Gore v. BMW of North America, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1996) when determining what punitive damages are appropriate.
78. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108 (1995).
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the courts since the mid 1800s. 79
Swirling about the center of the debate involving the ratio-
nale underlying punitive damages lies the central issue:
whether, despite all of the rhetoric, a cap on punitive damages
is necessary. In response to the dearth of comprehensive infor-
mation regarding the proclivity (or lack thereof) of successful
punitive damage awards, Dr. Stephen Daniels of the American
Bar Foundation8 ° conducted a nationwide study in an attempt to
determine the current trends in awards for punitive damages.
His findings are quite atypical of the popular beliefs promul-
gated by the proponents of reform. His first study was con-
ducted in the late 1980s and covered data collected for the years
between 1981 and 1985 which found that punitive damages
were awarded in only 4.9% of the cases reviewed.81 Subse-
quently, he conducted a follow up study in which he used a
broader database to determine the percentage of punitive dam-
age awards for the years 1988-1990.82 There he found that
"[o]verall, there were 19,404 civil jury verdicts in the counties
[represented. Of those verdicts,] 864 or 4.5% of the total verdicts
included a punitive damage award."83 His data also indicates
that "[s]uch awards were made in 8.3% of the cases in which
79. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Beyond the fact that it would un-
doubtedly take innumerable years for the various state supreme courts to determine pre-
cisely what the language of § 108 contemplates, this section clearly makes it easier for
the manufacturer to avoid liability for punitive damages. Beyond the standard of proof,
it is clear that through § 108 Congress has created a loophole that is large enough to
pass the entire provision through. The problems of proof that a plaintiff would face in
this situation would be enormous. Short of the production and presentation at trial of in-
ternal memoranda that implicate the defendant, the plaintiff would not be able to set
down the manufacturer's "conscious, flagrant indifference" by "clear and convincing evi-
dence!" H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108 (1995). When the prospect that many of the subpoe-
naed documents could be excluded by the attorney-client privilege or its legal cousin, the
work product privilege, or be protected under the guise of a trade secret, the prospects of
plaintiff success are further lessened.
80. Dr. Daniels stated during his testimony that the American Bar Foundation is an
independent legal research firm that is not privately funded by the American Bar Asso-
ciation. Daniels Statement, supra note 65, at 504.
81. Daniels & Martin, supra note 69, at 30-32. Dr. Daniels' data set was not limited
to products liability actions-his database was comprised of "25,000 civil jury awards be-
tween 1981 and 1985." S. REP. No. 69, at 62 (1995).
82. S. REP. No. 69, at 62. Dr. Daniels testimony before the subcommittee was based
largely upon his findings in the follow-up study. Daniels Prepared Statement, supra note
69, at 519.
83. Id. at 522. Table 1 of Dr. Daniels' statement to the Senate subcommittee out-
lines the different jurisdictions that generated the database. Included in this study are
15 states and more than 89 counties. Id. at 519-22.
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plaintiffs were successful."
When Dr. Daniels restricted his follow-up study database to
the jurisdictions used in his original study, the data yielded
nearly identical results.85 If nothing else, this study suggests
that there has not been a substantial increase in punitive dam-
age awards between the early 1980s and the turn of the decade.
Based upon this study, it is impossible to assert that punitive
damages are anywhere close to being "routinely awarded."8 6 For
example, Daniels found only one site where "the punitive dam-
age rate ... exceed[ed] one-quarter of all successful cases or 15
percent of all money damage verdicts."87 Interestingly, this is
one finding that is commonly cited as evidence of the need for
federal reform. "A main goal of tort reform would be to restrain
runaway punitive damage awards."8 8 However, it would seem
dangerous to overgeneralize local patterns into nationwide
epidemics, 89 and thereby undertake reform measures that may
prove to be undesireable or unresponsive to the needs of the
country in the long run.
Others have also studied the trends of punitive damages
awards and have divined similar results. In a study conducted
by Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, the authors
"uncovered just 353 punitive awards in products liability cases
between 1965 and 1990."90 Their findings do not end there-
"One quarter of all those awards involved.., asbestos. Another
one quarter . . . was reversed or remanded upon appeal. They
84. Id. at 522.
85. "Reducing our 1988-90 database to the same sites used in the earlier study
yields a punitive damage rate of 4.8% for all jury verdicts and 9.1% for successful ver-
dicts." Id.
86. Id. at 523.
87. Id. In other words, there was only one jurisdiction (Cook County, Illinois) where
punitive damages were awarded in greater than one quarter of all successful trials. The
same jurisdiction also accounted for the highest rate of punitive damage awards in suc-
cessful trials where money was awarded to the plaintiff. For these verdicts punitive
damage awards fell to a rate of one in 6.67. Id.
88. Dick Thornburgh, America's Civil Justice Dilemma: The Prospects for Reform, 55
MD. L. REV. 1074, 1083 & nn.78-82 (1996).
89. Professor George Priest of Yale Law School, himself a proponent of tort reform
in general, recognizes this fact. See Hearings on Punitive Damages Tort Reform Before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995 WL
149954 (statement of George Priest) [hereinafter Priest Statement]. Implicit in his state-
ment is a sense of the need to review representative data in order to reach a valid con-
clusion about punitive damages reform.
90. R. REP. No. 64, at 39 (1995) (dissent). Their database included all products lia-
bility awards from 1965-1990 in both state and federal courts. Id. The Supreme Court
has touted this study as "the most exhaustive study of punitive damages." Id.; see also S.
REP. No. 69, at 62 (1995).
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further found that the amount of punitive damages was not
skyrocketing."9 Even in the cases where punitive damages were
reported, 35% of those cases involved punitive awards that were
lower than the compensatory awards.9 2 The authors of this
study echoed Dr. Daniels' statements regarding the amount of
punitive damage awards: "[t]here is a widespread misperception
that punitive damage awards are skyrocketing because of frivo-
Slous lawsuits." 93 Given these facts, the argument that punitive
damages are a major problem seems somewhat remote. The ar-
gument seemingly becomes more remote when one reviews the
available data and finds that punitive damages are awarded by
juries in only a small fraction of successful, meritorious claims.
C. The Reformer's Position on Punitive Damages
Thus far, we have undertaken a general discussion of puni-
tive damages, its basis in American jurisprudence, and explored
the empirical data within the context of products liability law.
Given the findings presented thus far, it might seem mere sur-
plusage to engage in a discussion of the reformers' position.
However, mindful of the admonition that overgeneralization can
lead to inaccuracy and unreliability, it is evident that such an
analysis should be undertaken. The most obvious starting point
to mount a counterargument against the opponents' position is
upon the merits of their claim about the dearth of punitive dam-
age awards recovered in products liability cases. Very often,
numbers such as the ones presented above only begin to tell the
story.
As has been noted, only between two and five percent of all
civil claims filed in this country reach the trial stage.94 It is thus
hard to determine the absolute economic effect that our system
91. S. REP. No. 69, at 62.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 62-63 (quoting Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Demystifying the Func-
tions of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of a Quarter Cen-
tury of Verdicts). In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Proponents of reform
would do well to peruse the 1993 amendments made to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure [FED. R. Civ. P.]. Rule 11 was specifically amended to limit the number of frivolous
lawsuits filed by undeserving plaintiffs, while at the same time decreasing the amount of
satellite litigation alleging Rule 11 infractions. For an in-depth treatment of both the
1983 and 1993 amendments to FED. R CiV. P. 11, see Carl Tobias, Common Sense and
Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1995).
94. See Product Liability Fairness Act, 1995: Hearings on S. 565 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism, 104th Cong. 413 (1995)
(statement of Theodore B. Olson, Esq., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher on behalf of the Civil
Justice Reform Group) [hereinafter Olson Statement].
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of civil justice exerts upon businesses within and without the
United States. A more meaningful measure of the cost and effect
of punitive damages may be obtained by reliance upon a differ-
ent set of data. For example, a study which compares the per-
centage increase in settlement awards in cases where punitive
damages are claimed against the settlement awards in cases
where punitive damages are not claimed within each type of in-
jury would seemingly afford an opportunity to look more closely
at the absolute cost of punitive damages. Along the same lines,
some claim that these are the hidden costs in the current sys-
tem which, when measured, far outweigh the system's utility.
The more provocative question that such a study evinces
would be whether or not punitive damages are being awarded in
a manner requisite with their intent. If this is the case, then
clearly the claim of punitive damages is not being used merely
to ask a jury to proscribe a manufacturer's malicious and willful
conduct. Instead it is being used maliciously in an attempt to
gain leverage in settlement negotiations and throughout the en-
tire litigation process. Making matters worse is that these
claims arise out of the adversarial nature of our civil justice sys-
tem; there simply is no easily discernable way to separate legiti-
mate claims from the illegitimate ones.95 In terms of this argu-
ment, then, the problems associated with punitive damages
seem to go much deeper than products liability reform.96
Many of those who testified before the Senate and House of
Representatives took the position that products liability is not
the only area of civil law that ought to be reformed with respect
to punitive damages. "[T]he problem of arbitrary and excessive
punitive damages plagues commerce of every shape and form in
this country."97 Still others believe that a wholesale reform of the
"substantive standards of civil liability by federal legislation is
necessary 98 Whether or not such a huge undertaking is called
for, the fact is that it does not appear that the products liability
system is representative of the civil justice system as a whole.
95. 'The punitive damages system ... is driven exclusively by private litigants and
their lawyers, who have a personal, private interest in the outcome... 'A person who is
to profit by the punishment of another is likely to prefer severe punishment to admoni-
tion which will best serve social ends, and the two are not necessarily synonymous.'" Ol-
son Statement, supra note 94, at 422-23 (quoting Morris, supra note 76, at 1178).
96. A statement offered to Congress is instructive: "Of the top 20 punitive damage
verdicts in Alabama in 1994, amounting... to over $200,000,000, only one case was a
product liability action, accounting for less than 10 percent of the total." Olson State-
ment, supra note 94, at 434.
97. Id.
98. Priest Statement, supra note 89, at *3.
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The message that the reformers are sending to Congress is that
'if there is not a punitive damages problem in products liability
now in terms of volume of verdicts and their consequent dollar
amounts, the potential remains; reform today is better than to
repent tomorrow.' If there was nothing more for the reformers to
hang their hat on than this general argument, the message
rings hollow. Nevertheless, a more probing and refined analysis
suggests that there may be vitality to this position.
Deterrence is an oft-repeated mantra of those who believe
that punitive damages are necessary to curtail abusive, albeit
economically rational behavior. Over the past few years this ra-
tionale has come under increasing scrutiny. An example is illus-
trative: It has become evident that the Chief officers of the Ford
Motor Company were aware of the potential for harm to individ-
uals driving the Pinto by virtue of the placement of the gas tank
prior to the marketing of the vehicle. Despite this knowledge,
they consciously chose to forego any design modification.99 Thus,
it would seem that the possibility of punitive damages did not
serve to disuade Ford from producing an unsafe vehicle. If the
profits expected to be made from a product outweigh the ex-
pected costs (including the possibility of all types of damage
awards), the product will be manufactured. It is only in in-
stances where the cost and/or the profits are miscalculated that
such a product will be pulled from the market.
The question that remains is whether or not the Pinto or
any other similarly situated product would still be manufac-
tured if there was a cap upon punitive damages, or if punitive
damages were altogether nonexistent. Of course, it is impossible
to answer this question, but Priest speculates that the answer is
"no":
Is there some reason to believe that the payment of full compensatory
damages will fail to deter the defendant, such that some further multiple
of damages is necessary? ... Corporate defendants who must maximize
their profits net of costs must necessarily take the prospect of compensa-
tory damages into account in determining how to invest in accident pre-
vention. Again, this analysis presumes full compensationl&o
99. "[In the case of the Pinto], an economic calculation was made that 180 violent
deaths and 180 additional serious injuries would cost the company less than the $11 per
car necessary to prevent them Punitive Damages Tort Reform: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995 WL 221312, at *24
(statement of Robert Creamer, Director, Chicago Office of Citizen Action).
100. Priest Statement, supra note 89, at *15.
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Further, he believes that full compensatory damages "gener-
ate the optimal level of deterrence of accidents-not too little
and not too much.1°1 The only proper role under this economic
conception of compensatory damages would be to raise the level
of jury verdict awards to a level whereby victims would be fully
compensated. 0 2 Taking this analysis to its logical conclusion, we
arrive at a point whereby an injured party is more than justly
compensated for his injury by either overcompensation of com-
pensatory damages (economic losses plfis pain and suffering),
the awarding of punitive damages, or a combination of both. By
virtue of a steady diet of any of these situations, society would
be worse off due to the increased cost or simple lack of availabil-
ity of a product that was unjustly forced from the market.
Ill. THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S EFFECT ON AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
A. The Opponents' Viewpoint
Closely tied to the reformers' message that the entire prod-
ucts liability system needs to be governed by a single federal
statute across the 52 state jurisdictions 0 3 is the idea that the
current common law system undermines the competitiveness of
American companies and discourages research and development
of new products for the marketplace. In support of their effort,
messengers that tout reform as a way to return American busi-
nesses to the fore in the new "global economy" commonly refer
to studies which purport to show the devastating economic im-
pact of current products liability law.°4 Invariably, these accusa-
tions center around the popular topic of punitive damages and
how this system undermines competitiveness. Dr. Daniels refers
specifically to a technique he has dubbed as "strategic
101. Id. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992)).
102. One could assume that this level of full compensation would also be in line
with the manufacturer's assessment of the same.
103. This figure includes Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico. Legal analysts scoff at-
the idea that such a statute would create the desired level of uniformity Individual dif-
ferences in each jurisdiction would inevitably lead to differing results in different juris-
dictions. Given the wide array of issues that are brought to bear in any given case, there
is bound to be as much individual variation between jurisdictions as before. It seems as
though the reformers' wish to discount the frailty of the human condition in their search
for products liability's Utopia.
104. Many of these reformers specifically cite studies which show recent upward
trends in punitive damages awarded by juries. Unfortunately, much of their data is
based upon erroneous conclusions gleaned from the available data. Daniels Prepared
Statement, supra note 69.
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representation." 105
In particular, he points to the Punitive Damages Update, a
publication that was distributed to various organizations and
corporations sympathetic to tort reform proposals.106 Within one
of the mailings, readers were presented with a litany of horror
stories meant to appeal to our "prejudices and anxieties" and
"direct attention away from alternative explanations 07 that may
justify large punitive damage awards and portray defendants as
something other than the innocent victims of greed."'0 Though
effective, the message fails to stand up to a concerted analysis of
the available data. Studies that undertake this type of an in-
quiry generally result in a much different, and much more relia-
ble set of conclusions upon which to generalize to the society as
a whole. 0 9
At this point, one may well be asking why corporate
America would choose to rely on such an indirect method to
charge the product liability system with subverting American
competitiveness in the domestic and foreign markets. The rea-
sons for this are essentially two-fold: first, by providing a story
with enough of an emotive impact, the need for a protracted dis-
cussion of the scientific underpinnings of the available data are
105. Id. at 512-13. His definition of strategic representation is really nothing more
than a politically correct way to allege that there has been a certain degree of improper
characterization of the available data.
106. Id. at 513. More specifically, he cites a "press kit" that was "mailed to targeted
journalists the week prior to oral arguments before the Supreme Court" in a case that
challenged the constitutionality of punitive damages. Id. This mailing contained data
manipulated to portray "the punitive damages system as one so seriously flawed and
threatening as to require fundamental change." Id.
107. These misunderstandings could range anywhere from "misinterpreted public
perception" to "lack of government funding See Kenneth Jost, Tampering with Evidence:
The Liability and Competitiveness Myth, 78 ABA_ J. 44, 48 (1992).
108. Id. If public sentiment is any indication, this is the proper technique to use.
The press kit included the previously mentioned articles written by the CEO of Mon-
santo, one excerpt of which stated:
After the longest running trial in America's history a jury in Belleville, Ill.,
[sic] last year awarded one dollar to each of 65 plaintiffs as nominal damages
for alleged personal injuries in a case involving one of my company's prod-
ucts--orthochlorophenol crude-which is used to make wood preservatives.
Then, in a burst of tortured reasoning, the jury awarded $16 million in puni-
tive damages to the plaintiffs.
Id.
109. Dr. Daniels' research is one example of a study based upon proper scientific
foundations with conclusions that are supported by the data contained within the study.
Another example of the proper scientific method being applied to this topic is offered by
Michael Rustad in his article In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Tst-
ing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. Rav. 1 (1992).
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kept to a minimum; second, by linking a topic that is unpalat-
able to the corporations (the threat of unrestricted punitive
damages) to a prospect that is troubling to both the constituency
and their representatives (the fall of American companies' com-
petitiveness in the world markets), corporate America can use
one against the other and drive home the idea of a direct cause
and effect relationship. By forcing such a nexus upon the public
in general and upon the Congress in particular, the objective is
effectively accomplished. 10
The argument behind the collapse of American competitive-
ness can best be summed up as follows: the civil justice system
in America "places U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvan-
tage with their foreign counterparts since American companies
must spend billions on litigation costs and high insurance pre-
miums.""' Corporations thus have "less money for business rein-
vestment, product innovation, cost-saving measures," 2 and other
competitive practices."" 3 By claiming that they are not compet-
ing on a level playing field," 4 corporate America is able to once
again point to a simple one dimensional cause-and-effect
relationship.115
110. One cannot help but speculate how much money these companies save by
presenting their argument for reform using ancedotal evidence rather than compiling
and analyzing reliable data.
111. Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 30. See also Not Guilty, ECONOMST, Feb.
13, 1993, at 63; Jost, supra note 107, at 45.
112. Such as reducing the amount they pay in premiums to product liability insur-
ance carriers. Even this point is the subject of some contention as Congress heard testi-
mony from the American Insurance Association which stated: "jT]he bill is likely to have
little or no beneficial impact on the frequency or severity of product liability claims...
[A]nd it is not likely to reduce claims or improve the insurance market. 141 CoNG. REC.
S6370-1, 6402 (Statement of Sen. Kerry).
Furthermore, Sen. Kerry asserts that "over the last decade product liability insur-
ance costs 26 cents per $100 of retail product sales" and " ... [S]ince 1987... insur-
ance premiums have dropped by 47 percent, ... a fact that was confirmed by a 1992
Commerce Department study." kI
113. Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 30.
114. The unlevel playing field described by proponents of reform does not exist to
the extent that is claimed. "American plaintiffs may face some practical problems in pur-
suing suits against foreign concerns, but that difference creates no more than a 'moder-
ate advantage' for the foreign competitor against the US. firm." Jost, supra note 107, at
45.
115. Once again, the reformers appeal to anecdotal evidence to reinforce their con-
tention. An illustrative example is offered by Jost, supra note 107, at 46. Apparently, a
"study" was conducted whereby 4,000 executives were direct mailed a survey and asked
to complete and return it. Approximately 500 responses formed the basis of the study
which concluded "product liability concerns had caused 47 percent of U.S. manufacturers
to withdraw products from the market, 25 percent to discontinue forms of research, and
15 percent to lay off workers." Id. Certainly such dubious research methods demand
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While this may provide the "quick fix" that so many appar-
ently want and need, this argument ignores a central component
of the equation. As is true of the old algebraic maxim that what
you do to one side of the equation, you must always do to the
other side of the equation, so must the same be done to foreign
competitors. '"hen a foreign company sells a product that
causes injury to a person in the U.S., that foreign company is
subject to the same product liability laws as a domestic com-
pany."116 Therefore, it stands to reason that not only must a for-
eign company alter their product to prepare for this potentiality,
but they must also necessarily bear the same insurance and de-
velopmental costs as their domestic counterparts."7
The picture that the reformers would paint of the current
state of liability for personal injury in all jurisdictions outside of
the United States could be described as a tort-free vacuum.
While it is true that many other countries do not have tort sys-
tems directly analogous to our own, there are systems in place
that provide the deserving plaintiff with compensation." 8 It
would be foolhardy to assume that foreign compdtitors do not
contribute to the system of civil justice that has been erected
within its borders. In fact, it has been shown that "many coun-
close scrutiny of the database as well as the results. 'The flaws in such a study are so
substantial and so obvious that no self-respecting legislature should act on its results.&"
Jost, supra note 107, at 46 (quoting Theodore Eisenberg).
Given this fact, one can scarcely believe that it still being offered as an authorita-
tive measure of the need for reform. Yet, in his article published in the Maryland Law
Review in 1996, former Attorney General of the United States Richard Thornburgh cites
this "survey" as a reason why tort reform is necessary. See Thornburgh, supra note 88,
at 1076 & nn.28-30 (1996).
116. Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 139-40.
117. The author is not insensitive to the fact that a much larger number of products
are sold in the United States by domestic producers, but the absolute number of units
sold will not likely have an impact on the cost of coverage or on the cost to the company
to develop a safe product. If a foreign manufacturer decides to compete in the US. mar-
ket, the costs of developing a safer design and the cost of insurance coverage are fixed
costs. That is, once this cost is incurred, it makes no difference how many units are
manufactured for the US. market. (But, of course, it is assumed that the foreign compet-
itor is a rational actor in the market and will only produce until his marginal costs are
lower than his marginal revenue). For a more complete treatment of the issues
presented by fixed costs, marginal revenue, marginal cost and their effect on production
decisions, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Basic Economics of Antitrust, in FEDERAL ANTi.
TRUST POLICY. THE LAW OF CompruIoN AND rrs PRACTIcE 2 (West 1994).
118. In a large number of these foreign jurisdictions, the costs of the system appear
in the form of compliance to government regulations. Although less visible than the
American tort system, the financial burdens can be just as onerous. For instance, "Japan
is under pressure from foreign companies to make it easier to sue. These finms prefer
more lawsuits to the high costs of complying with Japanese safety regulations." Not
Guilty, supra note 111, at 63.
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tries with less 'threatening' tort systems often impose substan-
tially greater taxes and safety regulations that result in compli-
ance costs at least as great as any costs imposed by our tort
system."119
To describe the arguments made by the reformers regarding
the effects of the products liability system upon business strictly
in terms of competition does a disservice to their message as a
whole. Intimately linked to their competitiveness argument is
the idea that research and development of new products is
emasculated by the burden imposed by the current system. In-
surance premiums and the possibility of punitive damages serve
as underwriters to the death of the new products develop-
ment.12° Once again the parade of anecdotes is brought forth to
show devastating consequences which range from the vacuum
created by the pulling of the drug Bendectin off the market to
the decline of drug companies' investment on research involving
new vaccines and contraceptives. 12 ' Accordingly, "a National
Academy of Sciences panel has called products liability a major
source of the lag in developing drugs for contraception." 22 De-
spite the claims to the contrary, there is simply insufficient evi-
dence to support the dismantling of the current system.
In most instances, the threat of liability has been an incen-
tive for manufacturers to conduct more extensive research and
put more money into product development. 23 W. Kip Viscusi and
119. Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 30 (emphasis added).
120. A 1991 book entitled THE LIABmmrY MAZE, sought to point out just exactly how
our civil justice system has eroded the innovative spirit of American business. THE LDA-
BIL=Y MAZE (Peter W. Huber et al. eds., 1991). This book is a collection of articles writ-
ten by scholars and producers. "[T]he most damning evidence on innovation came from
papers on automobiles, pharmaceuticals and general-aviation aircraft, each written by
someone with long-standing financial ties to the industry he examined." Jost, supra note
107, at 48.
121. There is little doubt that these results have occurred; however, there is some
question as to how much of the result is due to. fear of litigation and how much is due to
fundamental flaws in the product itself. A notable case and point is offered by the Mon-
santo Corporations' substitute for asbestos. The CEO of Monsanto has for years claimed
that a product that they spent years (and untold amounts of money) developing as a
substitute for asbestos was pulled from the market before it reached the consumer. The
corporation claims that the rationale behind their decision was based solely upon the
threat of litigation. However, subsequent documents show that this "safe" alternative to
asbestos-calcium sodium metaphosphate fibers-has carcinogenic effects as well. See
Stewart Statement, supra note 21, at 30.
For a more protracted discussion of Bendectin and other products forced from the
market, see infra Part I.B.
122. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, An Industrial Profile of the Links between
Product Liability and Innovation, in THE LIABILrrY MAZE, supra note 120, at 81.
123. See id. The emphasis of this study was upon the effect of liability upon innova-
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Michael J. Moore found that "[t]ort liability, does, however, have
safety incentive effects. Higher levels of liability costs usually
increase product-related research and development"2 4 Further-
more, they conclude that "[flor most industries-including such
attractive products liability targets as automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, and the bulk of chemical industry... the costs
of product liability provide safety incentive effects that more
than offset the product withdrawal effects." 25
There has also been much discussion regarding the role that
liability premiums play in adversely affecting American competi-
tiveness. As the argument goes, the more that a company is
forced to pay in premiums, the more it suffers at the hands of
those that do not bear such costs. The effect on competitiveness
is naturally more severe the higher the cost for the coverage. As
will be discussed more fully below, the 1980s were a time when
liability premiums were extremely high, and the clamor for re-
form was based largely upon this fact.
This trend seems to have since abated. Recently, there has
been evidence presented to suggest that the cost of liability in-
surance for all types of accidents-products liability, slip and
fall, etc.-does not present an onerous burden on commerce. 126
During testimony before Congress, J. Robert Hunter stated that
"[t]he cost of [all] liability insurance-including self insurance
and other non-traditional forms of insurance has dropped.., on
an inflation adjusted basis ... [over] 20%."127 When restricted to
products liability, the research showed that insurance costs
"represented 19.9 cents per one hundred dollars of retail sales.
For a typical five dollar purchase, the cost ... is less than one
cent."m
These findings suggest that it is possible that the effects of
products liability litigation on insurance premiums are concen-
trated in a few industries. Although the costs of insurance pre-
miums when spread across the American economy seem minis-
tion. In this endeavor, they correlated industry insurance costs with the total number of
patent applications in each industry.
124. Id. at 114.
125. Jost, supra note 107, at 48 (quoting W. Kip Viscusi).
126. Product Liability Fairness Act, 1995: Hearings on S. 565 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism, 104th Cong. 90 (1995) (statement
of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance for Consumer Federation of America) [herein-
after Hunter Statement].
127. Id. "Product Liability insurance . .. in inflation adjusted terms has dropped
45% [since 1987]." Id.
128. Id. The study also found that the total cost of all liability insurance amounted
to less than 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (presumably for the fiscal year 1994). Id.
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cule, the effects will still be felt more acutely by those
consumers who must rely upon those industries more heavily for
their well being.
B. Products Liability and the Insurance Crisis
In the opening paragraphs of this Comment, it was men-
tioned that legislation to federalize the products liability system
has had a long history in the Congress. As the years passed and
new reform initiatives were proposed, supporters of the bills
sought to garner support for their position by linking contempo-
rary problems with the products liability system.2 9 Throughout
the late 1970s and into the 1980s, reform minded legislators
blamed the "insurance crisis" on products liability litigation. 30
As the validity of the connection between products liability and
the inability of companies to obtain and afford insurance cover-
age came under increased negative scrutiny, reformers shifted
their attack toward more fertile ground.
Much as today's reformers have done, it has been forcefully
argued that "at the advent of the so-called tort reform move-
ment, reformers were concerned more with convincing the
American public that there was a crisis and linking [it] to prod-
ucts liability, than about the reality of the crisis itself."' 3' The
clear intention was to garner support and to use any means pos-
sible to accomplish that end. "To quote professors Eisenberg and
Henderson, 'using every technique of modern media-shaping,
tort reform groups sought to assure that the public believed that
products liability law was the cause of this threat to our way of
life.' -132
Whatever probative effect this argument may have upon the
reformers alleged link between competitiveness and products li-
ability law, the main consideration in this section is to provide
an alternative explanation of the "insurance crisis." While the
existence of this crisis was very real,133 "[t]here is ample evi-
129. Id. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (addressing the link be-
tween products liability litigation and American businesses' competitiveness).
130. S. REP. No. 69, at 66 (1995).
131. Id. at 67.
132. Id. (quoting Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 30, at 793).
133. Among the companies hardest hit by the insurance crisis were manufacturers
of light aircraft. Early on, critics were quick to point to products liability law as the sole
reason behind soaring insurance rates. While it was argued that litigation destroyed this
industry, a better analysis seems to be that the system worked as it should. By recogniz-
ing that the product was so inherently dangerous and unsafe to the general population,
the actor was forced from the market. See generally Hunter Statement, supra note 126.
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dence that the increases in product liability insurance costs
were actually the result of the cyclical nature of the insurance
industry ... not product liability."f 3 More directly, the Chair-
man of the Commerce Department's Task Force on Product Lia-
bility stated "no one has ever demonstrated that the huge in-
creases in product liability premiums in recent years were
related to the number and/or size of product liability claims."135
Reformers have seemingly conceded that the insurance cri-
sis was not due in large part to the current state of products lia-
bility law if recent inaction on this issue is any indication. 136
Even if this contention is proved to be wrong, and the reformers
do seek to make this argument again in the future, their argu-
ment has been weakened by recent findings of an insurance
company (Aetna) that looked at the effects state product liability
reform had on the insurance rates within the state.137 Despite
enacting strict reform measures in products liability litigation,
the effect that these reforms had upon insurance rates was
listed as "zero" 38
Regardless of the likelihood that the reformers are correct
in their assertions about the cause of the insurance crisis, it
may be unwise to fully discount the implications of the insur-
ance company's findings. Having used the state as a "labora-
tory," an-in-depth analysis of the data may reveal whether prod-
ucts liability reform is capable of achieving even the modest
benefits provided by lower insurance rates. While this says
something about the magnitude of the effect products liability
134. S. REP. No. 69, at 67. An in-depth analysis of these issues will not be under-
taken here, however, an excellent explanation is offered by Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Property-Casualty Insurance Market Operation, CRS Report No. 85-629E (Mar. 20,
1985). There are also those who view this conception of the insurance crisis as overly
simplistic. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
135. S. REP. No. 69, at 67.
136. Inaction does not necessarily preclude reformers picking up the insurance ban-
ner, dusting it off, and reutilizing it as a tool to encourage reform at some later date:
The irony of the continuing debate over a federal product liability bill is that
insurance costs were emphasized... when premiums were high, and were de-
emphasized during [latter sessions] when insurance premiums were reduced.
In the 99th Congress, the proponents pointed again to the high premiums as
justification for a Federal bill, but these arguments disappeared in the 101st
and 102d Congresses.
S. Pp. No 69, at 68. These arguments are nowhere to be found in the final reports of
the 104th Congress either.
137. Id. at 74.
138. Id. The reforms included "eliminat[ing] joint and several liability, limit(ing]
non-economic damages to $450,000 and limit[ing] punitive damages." Id.
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litigation has upon the insurance industry, it may be indicative
of the manner in which products litigation effects American bus-
iness competitiveness as well.
C. The Reformer's Viewpoint on Competitiveness
Standing in stark contrast to the opponents of reform, those
who support federal legislation have little doubt that the cur-
rent system has stood as a barrier to increased American advan-
tage in the foreign and domestic markets. The contentions
presented in this section follow roughly the same course as
those in the Part II of the paper, but that should be of no sur-
prise; the relationship between these two areas of debate are, at
the very least, symbiotic.
As has been shown, one of the main contentions is that the
system creates a situation whereby profits are eroded or de-
stroyed by the increased costs of production inherent in the cur-
rent state law system. Several industries in particular seem to
be bearing the brunt of a large percentage of product liability
claims. The automobile, light aircraft, and health care industries
have been, by their very nature, highly susceptible to products
liability litigation. In the interests of economy, the discussion in
this section will focus upon the health care industry, with em-
phasis placed upon the problems encountered by those involved
in the research and development and marketing of health care
devices. 139
Two products in particular have had a large role in the
push for reform. Both the morning sickness drug Bendectin, and
the Copper-7 Intra Uterine Device were forced from the market
specifically because the cost of keeping the products on the mar-
ket in the face of rising litigation costs was prohibitive. In the
case of both products, litigation costs swallowed up the revenue
generated by their sales.4° In both cases, the withdrawal of the
139. I have restricted the argument to this segment of the health care field because
(1) it provides a fairly representative argument of the concerns of business interests; and
(2) it illustrates the interplay between the threat of litigation and its costs (inclusive of
punitive damages), insurance costs, research and development, and competitiveness in
the market.
140. Hearings on FDA Approval and Limits on Damage Awards Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995 WL 446832 (statement of
Janice Toran on behalf of G.D. Searle and Co.) [hereinafter Toran Statement]. In the case
of the Copper-7 device manufactured by Searle, "only one significant verdict had been
rendered against Searle in [this matter] ... [and] an appeal was pending when the case
settled." Id. at *9. No verdict was ever entered against the manufacturer of Bendectin.
Thornburgh, supra note 88, at 1081 & n.49.
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product(s) from the market "deprived women of a valuable ...
choice."' 4' In fact, "the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists calls the lack of available drugs to combat morn-
ing sickness 'a serious therapeutical gap.'"142
The attrition does not end there. Many pharmaceutical com-
panies are reticent to even begin work on much needed drugs
due to potential liability. 43 "The number of U.S. companies doing
contraception research has dropped from [eight in the 1970s] to
[two] today."144 Research for an AIDS vaccine seems to have
been similarly effected. "[M]any companies have delayed or
abandoned clinical trials of promising substances because of fear
of liability"145
That these products have been forced from the market may
be either good or bad for the consumer, depending upon the ef-
fects noticed in those affected, and the truth of the assertions
proferred. More relevant here is that these costs have lead to a
decrease in the availability of certain products. The longitudinal
effects of this litigation cannot be known for sure, but it does
highlight an issue which demands further exploration.
Embedded in this debate lies a fairly typical large firm/
small firm problem. While it is true that damage awards levied
against larger corporations throughout the country may only
amount to a small portion of the revenue generated by them in
one year, such is not necessarily the case for the vast majority
of small businesses which drive the economy. These smaller
businesses do not have the ability to internalize one-time occur-
rences such as product liability litigation. While an event such
as this might only increase the per unit price of a product sold
by Exxon by a few pennies, the effects of unlimited liability
upon a small business could be catastrophic.
That litigation-regardless of its merit-could force a
smaller manufacturer from the market could be damaging to the
economy if the pattern is repeated often enough. In a free mar-
ket, the natural result of a decreasing supply coupled with a
141. Toran Statement, supra note 140, at *4.
142. Id.
143. In an attempt to limit liability of drug manufacturers, it has been suggested
that those manufacturers who comply with all pertinent FDA regulations may not be
named in a products liability action. See generally id. Incidentally, the Product Liability
Reform Act of 1997 now before the Senate contains within it the "Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act of 1997," which would limit the liability of the supplier of the raw materi-
als used to make "lifesaving or life enhacing medical devices." 143 CONG. REc. S163-02,
S229.
144. Toran Statement, supra note 140, at *13.
145. Thornburgh, supra note 88, at 1080-81.
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static demand would be increased prices. Furthermore, if the
product subject to the higher price is also subject to a high
cross-elasticity of demand, a buyer will forego that product for a
similar, less expensive one. In the long run, competitiveness in
the marketplace is forfeited due to the increasing costs.14
A final point that ties in with the above economic argument
is the question of who bears the brunt of the increased costs
caused by the current system. Professor George Priest has at-
tempted to answer that question in his prepared remarks before
Congress. 147 According to his statement, the current structure
behaves much in the way that a regressive tax such as the sales
tax hurts the consumer:
Research of my own currently in progress shows that low income con-
suners, if injured, are less likely to seek an attorney;, even with an attor-
ney are less likely to sue; less likely to recover, and again by definition,
less likely to recover large damage judgments since their lost income is
typically low and pain and suffering awards, which are highly correlated
with lost income, equally low.148
Furthermore, he contends that the poor also suffer more on
the back end of a company's involvement in litigation. "Low in-
come consumers have less money . . . and regardless of the
product or service, are more seriously affected in terms of [their]
purchasing power where price . . . increases. Low income con-
sumers are forced to subsidize the high-income as expected...
damage awards are built into the prices of products and ser-
vices."149 As the poor reach their reservation price and forego the
product, competitiveness is once again diminished.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment has been to analyze the data
both for and against the reformers' most recent incarnation of
product liability reform, and make a determination as to
whether this reform of the products liability system is desirable.
At the close, we are perhaps no nearer a solid answer either
way. Aspects of each side's respective positions can be justified
on either policy or substantive factual grounds, yet neither
seems to have the upper hand.
146. See generally Hovencamp, supra note 117, at section 1.




If the arguments presented herein have provided convincing
evidence one way or the other, then the debate on this issue is
closed. However, I would think that for the vast majority of
readers, the debate continues to rage. What is more troublesome
is that on an intellectual level, it is very hard to base a decision
that seems so highly factual solely on a feeling of correctness.
This ambiguity can only be increased by the knowledge that
whichever decision is made, it is altogether uncertain whether a
lady or a tiger lies behind the door.
From my humble perspective, I offer the reader my feelings
on this subject, and the way in which I believe that the reform
movement should proceed. Once past the rhetoric and noise of
the realm of the political, several facts leap to the foreground.
First, there has been a tremendous amount of work being done
in the state legislatures that should not be overlooked. Any seri-
ous review of the substance of the tort reform legislation within
the states should be adequate to convince even the most
steadfast believers in the appropriateness of federal legislation
that there is a wide area of basic agreement on major issues. At
the same time, the American Law Institute is nearing comple-
tion on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. This
further suggests that the positions of the various states are coa-
lescing to a certain degree. The role of the ALI in this debate
should not be too readily relegated to the backseat as the con-
clusions drawn therefrom may shed light on what areas may or
may not be in need of reform. In this regard, the new Restate-
ment could be seen as a guidepost for future legislation at either
the state or the federal level. Furthermore, the fact that the Su-
preme Court has begun to refine its treatment of the issue of
punitive damages leads one to believe that further uniformity
can result by means other than federal legislation.
The insistence on national reform "without any comprehen-
sive data to demonstrate that the legislation will work"5 0 should
be avoided. 151 As state courts struggle to reconcile the meaning
behind the wording of section 108 and other sections in the act
which set national standards regarding products liability, an-
150. S. REP. No. 69, at 80 (1995).
151. This statement is echoed by J. Robert Hunter in his testimony before Congress:
Surely no case exists for massive intrusion on state's rights here ... To the ex-
tent that a particular product has a high cost of product liability, Congress can
look at that on a case by case basis, as it did for light aircraft manufacturers
[in 1994] ... There is simply no evidence of a need to alter the product liabil-
ity system in an overall way.
Hunter Statement, supra note 126, at 91.
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other consequence unfolds. Rather than nationalizing the stan-
dards, the individual state courts will necessarily devise their
own interpretations based upon the needs of the jurisdiction. It
will only be after a lengthy appellate review in the federal
courts and eventually, the Supreme Court, that the intended ef-
fect of nationalizing products liability law will be achieved. 152
Even disregarding the procedural dilemmas involved in this act,
we must consider the extralegal effects this standard will have
on our society.
The words of Justice Cardozo, uttered over 60 years ago
about the dangers inherent in standard setting are still ger-
mane in this context today. In order to prevent unintended and
unnecessary consequences, we would do well to heed his
admonitions:
[Iliustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in fram-
ing standards of behavior. The need is the more urgent when there is no
background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. They
are then, not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms,
but rules artificially developed from without. Extraordinary situations
may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fit-
ting for the commonplace or normal.'0
152. Of course, by the time this litigation reaches the Supreme Court, it is entirely
possible that the standards set down by the PLFA will no longer be an effective means
of adjudging products liability litigation.
153. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 US. 98 (1934).

